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ABSTRACT 
 
This workshop paper is motivated by the evolution of relations between public transport 
authorities and public transport operators all over the world. So far, however, there has been 
little discussion about this phenomenon with regard to Russian land passenger transport. 
This issue only received considerable critical attention in the 1990s in light of the post-soviet 
transformations. However, developments during the 2000s and 2010s have not been 
extensively studied. This period is filled with changes in market structure including the rapid 
growth of the private bus sector while electric transport remained publicly owned and 
operated. The regulatory policy has also undergone considerable changes in 2015. 
 
This workshop paper attempts to understand both positive and negative trends of evolution 
of organisational practices in Russian land passenger transport. The methodological 
approach is mixed and based on analysis of changes in legislation, market structure and 
contracting approaches. Studies of the largest cities, including the recent Moscow ‘new 
model’, are also performed. The overall structure of the study includes overviews of 
legislation, the performance of public operators and institutions in the private bus sector. 
This research offers important insights into the evolution of public transport contracting 
systems in developing countries. 
 
Keywords: Russia; Moscow; public transport; regulation; contracting; competitive tendering; 
new model. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the 1980s, many countries around the world started to reform public transport sectors. 
Authorities have been gradually decreasing transportation services by publicly-owned 
incumbent companies. Instead, they have started to regulate new entrants under competitive 
procedures and contracts. Public transport is now becoming more and more liberalised. 
Countries in Northern and Western Europe are leading this process and the reforms are 
spreading to other countries. 
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Organisational and regulatory changes are proceeding in land passenger transport in Russia 
as well. Rapid development of transport systems occurred between the 1950s and 1980s 
within the context of the urbanisation and industrialisation of the Soviet Union. Urban 
transport enterprises were financed and supervised by the Ministries of the RSFSR (Russian 
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) in the context of a planned economy. The only 
exception was Moscow where all transport companies were managed by the local 
authorities. The organisation and economics of land passenger transport, in contrast to 
technical issues, has never been an important theme for scholars in this period. Until now, 
we know of only a few papers (e.g. Blinkin et al., 1988; Otdelnova, 1988) that have 
described how public transport started to achieve deficits in the 1970s due to artificially low 
fares, “frozen” since 1948, the constantly growing number of free-riders and the absence of 
incentives to reduce production costs. 
 
New challenges were raised by Russia’s transition to a market economy in 1991. Public 
transport lost federal funding and vehicles from industry. The assets were transferred from 
federal to municipal ownership1 and transportation became the responsibility of local 
authorities. Municipally-owned unitary enterprises were set up to operate municipal assets in 
this period. The transformations of electric transport (i.e. metro, tram, trolleybus) generally 
stopped at this time, while evolution in the bus sector continued. Given the extremely difficult 
financial situation faced by municipalities, enterprises could not purchase new buses in the 
required quantities. Bus depots continually reduced the output and could not meet the 
demand. 
 
In the second half of the 1990s, private entrants started to fill market niches. The private 
sector experienced an enormous growth during the 1990s and 2000s. This started with 
individual private drivers and operators gradually being able to serve one or more routes. In 
2000, private suppliers were involved in providing minibus services in 307 of the 1,290 cities 
in Russia (Rodionov, 2000). By the 2010s, they were present in almost every municipality. 
As a result, the market share of traditional municipally-owned bus companies decreased and 
they lost monopoly status. 
  
Just as in other developing and transitional countries, public and private services vary 
greatly in Russia. Municipal unitary enterprises provide conventional transport services. 
They are characterised by large buses, which respect timetables and provide fare 
exemptions for young and elderly passengers. Private operators, in contrast, provide ‘Jitney’-
type transportation with chaotic services and aggressive forms of competition on the market. 
Their minibuses are called ‘Marshrutka’ in everyday speech. 
 
The 1990s attracted considerable critical attention from scholars studying the first decade of 
market transition. The crisis of municipal enterprises, the emergence of the private sector 
and the first regulatory experience were outlined both by Russian (Vaksman et al., 1992, 
2002; Kossoy, 2000; Rodionov, 2000) and foreign (Gwilliam, 2000) academics and advisors. 
During the 2000s, papers comparing Russia with other developing countries (Gwilliam, 2003; 
Kominek, 2005; Finn and Mulley, 2011) and reports with reform proposals (World Bank, 
2012; Oh and Gwilliam, 2013) continued to emerge. The most recent proposals were 
concerned with the need to commercialise unitary enterprises and improve the contractual 
                                               
1
 Russian Federation Supreme Council Resolution No 3020-1 of 27 December 1991. 
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system. Russian scholars at that time were concentrating on case studies involving 
particular cities (Zyryanov and Sanamov, 2007). 
 
However, previous studies do not cover regulatory changes during the 2010s when new 
legislation was introduced at all levels of government, particularly at the federal level. An 
important contribution was made with the introduction of Federal Law No 220-FZ (‘On the 
organisation of regular public transport’) in 2015. This legislation allowed either the use of 
currently practiced route franchises or a transition to public service contracts which are now 
starting to influence the markets. Moreover, a remarkable change was observed in Moscow 
with the implementation of gross cost contracts in 2016. These developments have led to a 
renewed interest in public transport reforms in Russia. 
  
2. Methods 
 
This paper provides an overview of institutional practices in Russian land passenger 
transport. It includes the relations between authorities and operators, the means of service 
quality regulation and the roles of private and public suppliers. The largest cities are 
discussed in this study. An overview of the Moscow ‘new model of partnership with private 
operators’ is also performed with regard to the following question: “What can we learn from 
Moscow?” 
 
The work is based on analysis of legislation, tender documentation, route lists and 
quantitative data provided by local authorities. In addition, interviews with Moscow 
authorities and operators are conducted to outline different views. 
 
3. Legal framework 
 
Local public transport in Russia is regulated by federal, regional and local legal acts. Federal 
legislation forms a fundamental framework for: 
 
● Civil relations between operators and passengers2. 
● Licensing of public transport activities3. 
● Insurance of operator’s liability against harm to the life, health and property of 
passengers4. 
● Requirements for safety and security5. 
● Organisation of regular public transport6. 
 
Regional governments are responsible for regulating fares for local transport7, which could 
be delegated to the local level. Local authorities are in charge for service specification - they 
define routes, timetables, types of vehicles, etc. Furthermore, they are obliged to choose 
operators under competitive procedures. 
                                               
2
 Federal Law No 14-FZ of 26 January 1996; Federal Law No 259-FZ of 8 November 2007. 
3
 Russian Government Resolution No 280 of 2 April 2012 (replaced previous regulation of 2006). 
4
 Federal Law No 67-FZ of 14 June 2012. 
5
 Federal Law No 16-FZ of 9 February 2007; Russian Government Resolution No 112 of 14 February 
2009; Resolution of Ministry of Transport No 7 of 15 January 2014; and others. 
6
 Federal Law No 220-FZ of 13 July 2015. 
7
 Russian Government Resolution No 239 of 7 March 1995; Federal Law No 220-FZ of 13 July 2015. 
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Federal Law No 220-FZ of 13 July 2015 (‘On the organisation of regular public transport’) 
has established the legal basis for the planning, organisation and administration of regular 
services provided by bus, trolleybus and tramway. This legislation established four types of 
route: interregional, adjacent interregional, intermunicipal and municipal. The first is related 
to long-distance coach services, while the latter three regulate regional and local routes. 
These segments are regulated by different policies (see Table 1). 
 
The interregional services are regulated under the most liberal model - a market initiative 
regime. One should note that this option has been unintentionally used since 1991. The role 
of the 2015 Federal Law was to formalise and clarify this practice. Under the Law, the routes 
are opened at the commercial initiative of an operator. The fares, types of vehicles and 
timetables are defined by an operator. To start running services, an operator has to submit a 
route proposal to the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation and will obtain a route 
certificate if it satisfies a simple list of requirements. These include the following: highways 
must be in a normal condition, emission standard of vehicles must meet the regional 
environmental policy, bus stations must have enough capacity and the headways between 
the routes with parallel segments must be higher than the established minimum8. The 
interregional market is now presented by roughly 1,200 companies and entrepreneurs 
serving 3,200 routes with 12,000 buses authorised for such services. 
 
The remaining three types of routes (adjacent interregional, intermunicipal and municipal) 
are organised, in contrast, in an authority initiative manner. Adjacent interregional routes are 
organised under an agreement between governments of a federal city and the surrounding 
region9, intermunicipal services are the responsibility of regional governments and municipal 
services are organised by local authorities. Routes, timetables, fares, and types of vehicle 
are defined by authorities at a certain level. The invitation, financing (if specified) and control 
of operators is also the responsibility of authorities. 
 
The Law identified two options for organising such routes. Authorities can organise them as 
services with either ‘regulated fares’ or ‘non-regulated fares’. More broadly, they can be 
described as non-commercial and commercial services, respectively. 
 
Services with regulated fares have to be organised through public service obligation 
contracts according to Russian legislation on public procurement. Authorities can choose a 
gross cost or net cost financing model. 
 
The services with non-regulated fares represent a more simplified alternative without any 
budgetary obligations (excluding concessionary fare compensations that could be provided). 
The operators are invited according to a special procedure of ‘open tenders with non-price 
criteria’ - a procedure not covered by legislation in public procurement. After winning a 
tender, an operator achieves a route certificate with an exclusive right to run a particular 
route for five or more years. From an international perspective, this model could be classified 
as route franchising. 
                                               
8
 Resolution of Ministry of Transport No 368 of 16 December 2015. 
9
 There are only three such cases in the Russian Federation: Moscow, Saint Petersburg and 
Sevastopol. 
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Table 1 Organisational models according to Federal Law No 220-FZ 
  Interregional services Adjacent interregional, intermunicipal and municipal 
services 
non-regulated fares 
(commercial services) 
regulated fares (non-
commercial services) 
1 Organisational model Operator initiative route 
authorisation 
Authority initiative route 
franchising 
Authority initiative public 
service contract 
2 Type of competition Competition on the 
market 
Competition for the 
market and competition 
on the market 
Competition for the 
market and (possible) 
competition on the 
market 
3 Method of inviting the 
operator 
The right to run services 
is given to the operator 
who proposes the route 
Open tender with non-
price criteria 
Public service 
procurement 
4 Criteria of bids 
evaluation 
None 4 non-price criteria Defined by tender 
documentation 
5 Duration of operator’s 
rights to run services 
Unlimited From 5 years Defined by tender 
documentation and 
contract 
6 Documents confirming 
operator rights 
Route certificate and 
cards for each vehicle 
Route certificate and 
cards for each vehicle 
Public service contract 
and cards for each 
vehicle 
7 Service specifications to 
operators (e.g., vehicles, 
timetables, tickets, 
additional services) 
Ministry of Transport 
reviews operator's 
application to meet 
Federal Law 
requirements 
Authorities can ask only 
3 requirements: quantity, 
capacity and emission 
standard of vehicles 
Defined by tender 
documentation and 
contract 
8 Penalties for poor 
performance 
None None Defined by tender 
documentation and 
contract 
9 Fare regulations Fares set by operators Fares set by operators Fares set by regional (or 
municipal) authorities 
10 Financing model Fare revenues only Fare revenues. 
Compensation for 
concessionary fares 
possible 
2 alternatives: 
gross cost contract or 
net cost contract 
 
4. Public sector 
 
Municipal and state unitary enterprises represent the backbone of local transport. These 
suppliers provide all tram and trolleybus output and hold a significant share of bus markets. 
Amongst the 15 largest Russian cities with a population of over 1 million people, 14 have 
bus enterprises10, 15 - trolleybus, 14 - tram11 and 7 - metro12. Land transport companies 
                                               
10
 Excluding Perm where a municipally-owned bus company was liquidated in the late 2000s. 
11
 Excluding Voronezh, where a tramway system broke down in the 2000s. 
12
 Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Yekaterinburg, Nizhniy Novgorod, Kazan and Samara. 
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serve comprehensive networks, while metro systems are developed only in Moscow (12 
lines) and Saint Petersburg (5 lines). The rest have small metro systems of one or two lines. 
 
An important historical feature is the administrative separation of different transport 
industries. Bus enterprises were separated from electric services as well as metro from land 
transport. In the Soviet era, bus companies were administered by the Ministry of Road 
Transport of the RSFSR; tram and trolleybus - by the Ministry of Housing and Utilities of the 
RSFSR; and metro - by the Ministry of Railways of USSR. Moreover, numerous bus depots 
in the largest cities have never been centralised under one institution. Multiple attempts to 
consolidate industries were made between the 1950s and 1980s (Kossoy, 2000). The only 
success was achieved in Moscow where land transport was consolidated into the Passenger 
Transport Authority (currently state unitary enterprise Mosgortrans) in 1958. Many other 
attempts failed both in the Soviet period and market transition period. 
 
In the 1990s, with the emergence of the private sector, public bus operators lost a significant 
share of their patronage. However, during the 1990s and 2000s, they enjoyed the privilege 
of operating on historical routes, while private entrants started to work on new routes, usually 
in parallel to a public operator. The practices of so-called ‘open tenders with non-price 
criteria’ for all routes, including historical ones, started in particular cities in the late 2000s. 
Nevertheless, public operators usually remained on historical routes as they were 
unprofitable for private rivals due to obligations to use large vehicles and provide fare 
exemptions. 
 
The relations of local authorities and in-house operators could be classified as informal. 
Local bodies do not formally regulate operators. Usually, they do not set short-term and 
medium-term goals for operators, do not monitor the results of their performance and, most 
importantly, do not formally separate financial obligations for operators and local budgets. 
The obligations are only briefly outlined by charter documents, whereas contractual 
agreements and clear service specification are not practiced. The mutual obligations 
between operators and authorities are not set in advance. Authorities do not bear financing 
obligations while the operators do not have production and quality benchmarks. Therefore, 
this system guarantees neither stable financing nor control of performance and production 
costs. 
 
For many decades, the financial deficit of unitary enterprises has been perceived as both 
normal and inevitable. In 2016, 63.7% of bus and 79.8% of electric transport enterprises 
yielded debts (Rosstat FSSS, 2016: Table 1.14), which were then repaid by local budgets 
with ex-post subsidies. At the end of each year, public companies calculate revenue 
reductions and apply to authorities for compensation. Deficit compensation does not allow 
authorities to plan the exact required amounts of public expenditures beforehand. For this 
reason, the planned sums of public expenditures often do not meet the estimations of 
operators. This results in numerous conflicts between operators and authorities, debts to 
electricity suppliers and a shortage of financing to vehicle replacement and infrastructure 
maintenance. 
 
The Federal Law 2015 includes special sections aimed at reforming unitary enterprises. The 
authorities are required to award public contracts to municipal unitary enterprises by 2020 
and state unitary enterprises by 2025. During the first two years after the implementation of 
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the Law (2015 - 2017), these reforms were carried out in few cities, e.g. Surgut (bus), 
Tyumen (bus), and Nizhniy Tagil (tram). These contracts include clear service specifications, 
penalties for poor performance (e.g. punctuality) and ex-ante net cost financing. The 
important features of these contracts are their short contract duration (typically one year) and 
the absence of obligations for vehicle replacement, which remains on the side of authorities 
and has to be done using other budgetary programmes. Nonetheless, these first contractual 
attempts are intended to understand the adequacy of obligations as well as to monitor 
unitary enterprises as contractors. It seems that subsequent contracts will be awarded for 
longer periods. Generally, these contracts are given a legal basis for improving the financial 
status and eliminating debt risks. 
 
A new trend has recently emerged in the field of rolling stock purchases by public operators. 
The Moscow state-owned unitary enterprises Mosgortrans and Moscow Metro started to 
award life cycle contracts with manufacturers of buses, trams and metro trains. Between 
2014 and 2016, contracts for 436 buses, 300 trams and 1,432 metro cars were awarded. 
These contracts include the manufacturer's obligations to produce, deliver and, then, 
maintain the rolling stock at Moscow depots during seven years for buses and 30 years for 
trams and metro cars. The essential part of these contracts is an obligation to guarantee the 
everyday availability of 95% of the bus fleet, 90% of trams and 93.5% of metro rolling stock. 
These contracts are aimed, from the operator’s perspective, at reducing costs and 
increasing the durability of rolling stock and spare parts and, from the manufacturer’s 
perspective, at enhancing the long-term development. 
 
5. The private bus sector 
 
Private operators play a significant role in bus markets. Dozens of operators serve 50 - 100 
bus routes with 1,000 - 1,500 minibuses in the largest cities. Their market share, in 
comparison with traditional unitary enterprises, varies according to local policy: from 
moderate (Moscow and Kazan) to dominant (Saint Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Omsk, 
Voronezh, and Volgograd) or absolute (Perm). The corporate structure is also differentiated. 
Cities like Novosibirsk, Omsk and Volgograd are occupied by tiny operators. Almost every 
route is served by numerous companies (typically 2 - 5), whose activities are not 
coordinated. One should mention that this system was legally established by local 
authorities. A more favourable situation is observed in Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Kazan, 
Samara, and Rostov-on-Don where the markets are more or less consolidated (see 
Table 2). 
 
The quality of service has traditionally been chaotic, unsafe and poor akin to the informal 
transport of developing countries. The only exception is private operators working under the 
‘new model’ in Moscow since 2016. This reform has obviously improved the quality of 
services and enhanced the image of the Moscow transportation system. The ‘new model’ is 
studied separately within the latter section of this paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
Table 2 Local bus markets of the largest Russian cities 
  Population, 
thousands 
(01.01.2016) 
Municipal (state) bus operators Private bus operators 
Operators Routes Buses Operators Routes Buses 
Moscow 12,325 1 630 6,400 8 211 1,960 
Saint Petersburg 5,222 1 144 1,884 17 472 3,700 
Novosibirsk 1,584 2 25 235 70 123 1,358 
Yekaterinburg 1,444 1 29 323 29 60 1,135 
Nizhniy Novgorod 1,272 1 59 517 39 60 1,031 
Kazan 1,217 2 39 527 9 22 267 
Chelyabinsk 1,197 1 33 213 27 43 1,231 
Omsk 1,180 3 47 536 86 133 2,730 
Samara 1,171 1 45 462 3 59 1,424 
Rostov-on-Don 1,118 1 16 169 15 100 1,171 
Ufa 1,115 1 41 336 11 89 1,353 
Krasnoyarsk 1,069 3 26 259 38 44 712 
Perm 1,036 - - - 41 63 961 
Voronezh 1,033 2 18 171 12 85 1,256 
Volgograd 1,018 1 38 105 81 162 4,292 
 
Organisational models in local bus transport have been continuously evolving from free 
market to route franchises. During the 1990s, at an initial phase of private sector 
development, their activities remained unregulated. During the 2000s, operator initiative 
route authorisations became common. Since the late 2000s, due to increasing numbers of 
entrants, authorities have started to grant exclusive route franchises by a so-called ‘open 
tenders with non-price criteria’. Authorities strived to improve service quality using tender 
requirements (e.g. type and quantity of buses) and non-price criteria to evaluate the bidders 
(e.g. bus age). Authorities awarded contracts with the exclusive right of a particular operator 
to run a particular route for a defined period (usually five years). The contract volume was 
typically modest (usually 10 - 20 pages), but allowed service specifications and penalties to 
be included. In addition, fares were regulated, however, operators did not carry 
concessionary passengers and could not apply for subsidies. 
 
The latter model was preserved (with some exceptions) by Federal Law 2015 as services 
with non-regulated fares. The first exception, as the name implies, approves the absence of 
fare regulation. Secondly, the list of service quality specifications was reduced. Thirdly, 
contracts were replaced by so-called route certificates - a single page form. 
 
A process of ‘open tenders with non-price criteria’ became far easier for the operators. Since 
2015, local tender documentation can request only three mandatory requirements: maximum 
quantity, and the capacity and emission standard of vehicles. Usually, it is ‘up to 15 
minibuses with any emission standard’. In other words, authorities cannot force bidders to 
use new low-floor buses with air conditioners. Then the bids have to be evaluated by four 
non-price criteria: (1) number of traffic accidents in the previous year; (2) number of years in 
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public transport business; (3) vehicle quality and equipment (defined by local authorities); (4) 
vehicle age. Local authorities define a grading scale for these criteria and compare the bids 
(see Figure 1). The most valuable criteria are usually those reflecting the vehicle’s quality 
and equipment (42% of the maximum points) and age (26%). The criteria reflecting the 
number of years in business and accidents are less important - 11% and 9% respectively. 
Before the implementation of the Law, authorities often used other criteria (e.g. bus depot 
characteristics). These criteria were not revised in cities such as Kazan, Samara, 
Krasnoyarsk and Voronezh, which have not undertaken new tenders in the last two years. 
 
 
Figure 1 Award criteria in the largest cities (routes with non-regulated fares).13 
 
As shown by recent tenders, the winning score is in the 60% to 80% range of the maximum 
possible points (see Table 3). However, the problem is associated with the thresholds for 
which the points are awarded. Many examples show that the maximum (or at least sufficient) 
number of points for the vehicle age criterion are awarded for the proposal to use minibuses 
aged five years at the moment of a tender. As a result, these vehicles are allowed to run for 
the following five years, i.e. for 10 years of full utilisation. However, the normal life cycle of a 
jitney minibus is no more than 5 - 6 years due to the aggressive driving styles of drivers and 
poor technical maintenance. As a consequence, these thresholds do not provide sufficient 
incentives to improve the quality of service. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
13
 Assumptions based on the use of 15 buses on a single route. 
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Table 3 Result of ‘open tenders with non-price criteria’ in Novosibirsk, Kazan and Omsk 
  Novosibirsk Kazan Omsk 
Number of observed ‘open tenders 
with non-price criteria’ 
152 (2013 - 2014) 72 (2012 - 2014) 231 (2013) 
Average number of bidders (except 
tenders with no bids) 
4.4 1.6 4.8 
Average score of winning bid (% of 
maximum points) 
79.7% 61.0% 67.0% 
 
The winner achieves a 5-year route certificate which only includes brief records on the 
operator, route, number of vehicles, their capacity and emission standard. Therefore, the 
‘non-regulated fares’ model does not provide legal arrangements on service quality 
specification and service control. Operators, working under this model, are inevitably 
remaining within the ‘Jitney’ or ‘Marshrutka’ segment. 
 
In this regard, the transition to the ‘regulated fares’ model with the use of the contracting 
system is proposed to be the only alternative in respect to service quality improvements. 
During the first two years after the Federal Law 2015 implementation, the best example of 
such improvements was observed in Moscow with the introduction of the ‘new model of 
partnership with private operators’. 
 
6. The Moscow ‘new model’ 
 
6.1. Market overview 
 
Moscow is the largest city in Russia with a population of over 12 million inhabitants. The 
majority of transport output has traditionally been provided by the Mosgortrans state unitary 
enterprise (formerly Passenger Transport Authority). Since 1991, with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, public transport activities have been liberalised and new entrants have started 
to complement the market with minibuses. By the 2010s they held 30% of the bus market. In 
2015, 67 private operators served 450 routes using 4,300 minibuses. State unitary 
enterprise Mosgortrans served 70% of the market or 630 bus routes with 6,400 conventional 
buses. Although the organisational model of private operators has evolved from free market 
to competitive route authorisations (see Table 4), the quality of service has always been 
criticised for poor safety and comfort, the absence of modern ticketing systems and no fare 
exemptions. The Moscow bus system was in fact divided into two parts: so-called social and 
commercial branches. Moscow Department for Transport and Road Infrastructure 
Development understood the need for reform and initiated a project that was named a ‘new 
model of partnership with private operators’. 
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Table 4 Evolution of regulation of private operators in Moscow before the ‘new model’ 
 1991 - 1998 1998 - 2006 2006 - 2014 
Legislation Not regulated Resolution of the first 
deputy prime minister of 
the Moscow Government 
No 336-RZP of 20 April 
1998 
Resolution of the Moscow 
Government No 421-PP 
of 20 June 2006 
Organisational model Free market Operator initiative route 
authorisation: 
- Operator proposes the 
route. 
- Moscow Government 
reviews the route and 
grants the authorisation. 
Operator initiative route 
authorisation after tender: 
- Operator proposes the 
route. 
- Moscow Government 
reviews the route, then 
organises ‘open tender 
with non-price criteria’, 
and then grants the 
authorisation. 
Duration of operator’s 
rights to run services 
Not regulated Unlimited 5 years 
 
6.2. Preparation stage 
 
The reform was thoroughly prepared by the Department for Transport between 2012 and 
2015 including the following steps: 
 
● Study of international experience of bus reforms. 
● Extensive consultations with existing operators. 
● Consultations with the Moscow Department for Finance and the Moscow Department 
for Economic Policy and Development. 
● Consultations with the Moscow Office of Federal Antimonopoly Service of the 
Russian Federation. 
● Meetings with Russian and Belarussian bus manufacturers, leasing companies and 
banks. 
● Passage of amendments on the legislation of public transport in Moscow. 
● Recruitment of competent personnel to the Department for Transport and its 
subsidiary agencies. These personnel were tasked with designing routes, managing 
contracts and monitoring the operator’s performance. In summary, the staff included 
50 people in the offices and 30 in the Line Control division. 
● Comprehensive redesign of routes including their reduction from 450 to 211. 
 
An essential part of the reform was market consultations. In early 2013, the Department for 
Transport wished to make a reform at a meeting with all operators. The first response was 
highly negative - companies were dissatisfied with the growing role of the authority and 
increasing service specifications. The Department responded with a proposal to draft the 
contract in consideration of the operators’ points of view. A group of large operators (5 - 10 
companies) accepted such an offer while the smallest ones (approximately 60) rejected it. 
The largest companies were motivated to save their market share even under another 
institutional basis. The legal and financial framework of the contract was designed by the 
Department over the next 2 years (2013 - 2014) with the support of operators. In particular, 
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operators confirmed the compensation formula based on current Mosgortrans prices plus 
5% profit. 
 
6.3. Contract details 
 
The contracts include vast service specifications, which in fact required the purchase of 
almost an entire new bus fleet (2,000 buses including large, medium and small ones). The 
length of the contract was for five years plus an additional six months for preparation after 
the contract award. In terms of financing, the contract provides gross-cost monthly payments 
including three components: 
 
1. Reward for bus trips. 
2. Reward for paid passenger journeys (with upper limit) minus penalties. 
3. Compensation of some costs (vehicle purchase, insurance fees, taxes, fuel costs). 
 
The contracts include a list of 27 penalty terms, for which a reward for the paid passengers 
could be decreased. The share of possible penalties in the total lump-sums is limited to 
approximately 10% while the bonus payments are not specified. The performance is 
monitored using three methods: GLONASS-based automated monitoring system (equivalent 
to GPS), the Line Control division and CCTV cameras. The penalties included bus 
cleanliness and maintenance, speed on the route, and punctuality. 
 
6.4. Electronic auctions 
 
The 211 routes were merged into 63 route bundles. Every bundle included up to 14 routes 
located in more or less one district of the city. 
 
Most of the auctions (61 of 63) were awarded towards the end of 2015. From the authorities’ 
point of view, the reform had to be carried out simultaneously to prevent possible criticism 
affecting the following rounds of auctions. It also created an appearance of a rapid 
improvement in quality. 
 
The auctions were strongly characterised by weak competition. The contracts were awarded 
only for eight companies (instead of 67 incumbents) and the price reductions were observed 
only in 11 of 63 auctions. The total contract prices were reduced by 0.28%. The majority of 
contracts were awarded to the only bidder or to the bidder who made the first bid with no 
price reduction. From the operator's perspectives, the lack of competition could be explained 
using the following arguments: 
 
● The ‘fundamentally modest’ contract prices. 
● The uncertainty of future prices (up to the year 2021) - due to a sharp increase in the 
national inflation index from a typical 6% to 12% in 2014. 
● The difficulties for small operators to pay the 5% auction fee and purchase new 
vehicles. 
● The unwillingness to participate in auctions with large buses as it meant the need to 
reconstruct bus depots and train the drivers. 
● The need to change the philosophy of operations from market to authority initiative 
regime. 
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Nevertheless, the bidders demonstrated a rational tendering policy: 
 
● The routes were chosen in accordance with depot locations. 
● The calculations on the profitability of every bundle according to vehicle utilisation, 
commercial speed, etc. were performed by operators. 
● The investment for the use of large buses was carefully evaluated. As a result, 80% 
of such routes were awarded to the largest operator - Transavtoliz (Autoline Group). 
● Preliminary agreements with bus manufacturers, depots owners, banks and leasing 
companies were reached before the auctions. 
● Some operators were consulted by external advisors. 
 
6.5. Preparation to run services 
 
Operators had six months to prepare to run services after the contract award. This period 
was filled with new challenges: 
 
● Manufacturers of large and medium buses were overloaded which resulted in delays 
in bus delivery. Only 142 of 211 routes ran on schedule after six months. Others 
were supplemented in the following two months. 
● The bus depot market has changed: some operators changed the locations, while 
some modernised the equipment to maintain large and medium buses. 
● The labour force market was strongly affected. The number of drivers was reduced 
from 10,000 to 4,000 and many previous staff were replaced by those with 
experience in driving large buses (usually drivers from public enterprises). 
 
6.6. Results of the first year 
 
Most of the operators started running services on 9 May to 15 June 2016. The launch of the 
system became a new stage for the Russian bus market. However, the Moscow case shows 
the difficulties that may arise for authorities and operators. 
 
During the first year of operation (from May 2016 to May 2017), the Moscow Department for 
Transport received 9,000 claims from passengers via mail, phone, website or mobile 
applications. Most of these claims were sent during the first few months after launching the 
system. Passengers were dissatisfied with the lack of information, the closure of old routes 
or the over-crowdedness of the new ones. Many of these claims could be solved only by 
increasing the service frequency. The Moscow Department for Transport established a 
special Centre aimed at analysing the claims and correcting the frequency. One should note 
that Russian procurement legislation allows contract renegotiation with a 10% change in 
production and costs. As a result, the frequency of 122 of 211 routes was increased during 
the first year of operations. The terms of 33 of 63 contracts were changed with an overall 
increase in costs by 0.40%. 
 
The penalty payments strongly affected the operators’ performance. Companies started to 
regulate and standardise their internal processes. ‘New model’ participants were internally 
reformed and lost any similarity with the ‘Marshrutka’ operators: 
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● Penalties for excessive speed affected the labour management heavily. Dismissals 
for driving style became a widespread practice, while the role of driving training and 
control increased as well. 
● Penalties for punctuality motivated the development of dispatching systems. 
● Penalties for cleanliness and maintenance improved the speed of repair works after 
road accidents. 
 
The first year had also shown previously underestimated terms of the contracts that affect 
the operator's profitability. Firstly, the value of penalties became obvious - the majority of 
operators received the 10% maximum penalties for several months just after launching the 
system. Secondly, the reward for paid passengers became unfavourable because of its 
upper (but not lower) limit. Thirdly, operators were unhappy due to the inaccuracy of 
automated monitoring systems in the first months. Fourthly, operators noticed the inflexibility 
of the contract in terms of inflation. 
 
As a result, a year after the reform the majority of operators did not reach 5% profitability and 
were working at zero profits. An opportunity to enhance the performance through reducing 
the costs remains unclear. The Moscow market cannot now be classified as commercially 
attractive from the operators’ perspective. The majority of operators have increased their 
activities in other markets - the market of services with non-regulated fares in Moscow 
suburbs and the market of hired buses for corporate clients. Operators pay attention to the 
emergence of internal cross-subsidies. This raises questions on optimal contract terms in 
regard to the operators’ needs. 
 
At the same time, the reform draws attention to the role of the authorities. The slogan ‘The 
city has accepted responsibility for every passenger’, from the Moscow Department for 
Transport 2016 annual report (Moscow DfT, 2017), reflects the nature of the reform. The 
Moscow Department for Transport has evolved from a ‘laissez-faire’ agency into a 
professional and reliable public transport authority able to prepare and execute reform. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The reforms in Russian land passenger transport offer an important example for developing 
and transitional countries. Organisational models were evolving step-by-step from a free 
market to route franchises. The case of Moscow shows the potential for the next step - gross 
cost route contracts. Nevertheless, this step remains almost impossible without adequate 
planning and staffing, fair market consultation, attention to passenger needs and overall 
increase of responsibility of public transport authorities. 
 
  
 15 
References 
 
Blinkin M., Gurevich G., and Sarychev A. (1988). Avtomatizirovannye sistemy transportnogo 
planirovaniya (Automated transport planning systems). The results of science and 
technology. Road and urban transport series, Vol. 13. VINITI. Moscow. 
 
Finn B. and Mulley C. (2011). Urban bus services in developing countries and countries in 
transition: a framework for regulatory and institutional developments. Journal of public 
transportation, Vol. 14 (4): 89-107. 
 
Gwilliam K. (2000). Private participation in public transport in the FSU. In: TWU Series. 
TWU-40. The World Bank. 
 
Gwilliam K. (2003). Bus franchising in developing countries: some recent World Bank 
experience. Proceedings of the 8th Conference on competition and ownership in land 
passenger transport. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
 
Kominek Z. (2005). Filling the gap in urban transport: private sector participation in transition 
countries. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development working paper No 93. 
 
Kossoy Y. (2000). Strukturno-funktsionalnoe reformirovanie predpriyatiy GPT (The structural 
and functional reforming of urban passenger transport companies). Proceedings of the 9th 
Conference on social and economic problems of town transport systems and areas of their 
influence development. Yekaterinburg, Russia: Ural State University of Economics. 
 
Moscow DfT (2017). Itogi raboty transportnogo kompleksa za 2016 god i plany na 2017 god 
(The results of transport complex in 2016 and plans for 2017). URL: 
http://transport.mos.ru/common/upload/docs/1485343827_Otchetza2016godFinal3.pdf  
 
Oh J. and Gwilliam K. (2013). Review of the urban transport sector in the Russian 
Federation. Transition to long-term sustainability. In: Transport Papers. TP-41. The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank. 
 
Otdelnova E. (1988). Sovershenstvovanie planirovaniya gorogskogo passazhirskogo 
transporta (The improvement of urban transport planning). Proceedings of the 2nd 
Conference on social and economic problems of urban transport systems. Sverdlovsk, 
Russia: Sverdlovsk Institute of Economics 
 
Rodionov A. (2000). Pravovie osnovy organizacii transportnogo obsluzhivaniya gorodskogo 
naseleniya (The legal foundations of organisation of public transportation services for 
citizens). Moscow: The Institute for Urban Economics. 
 
Rosstat Federal State Statistics Service (2016). Transport i svyaz v Rossii (Transport and 
communication in Russia). Statistical handbook. Moscow. 
 
Vaksman S., Shipitsin Y., Sychev G., Miroshnik A., and Mikhaylov V. (1992). Upravleniye 
predpriyatiyami nazemnymi gorodskogo elektrotransporta v krupneyshikh gorodakh 
(Management of local land electric transport enterprises in the largest cities) Proceedings of 
 16 
the 4th Conference on social and economic problems of urban transport systems. 
Yekaterinburg, Russia: Ural State University of Economics. 
 
Vaksman S., Goncharova M., and Semushina M. (2002). Sistema dogovornykh otnosheniy v 
transportno-passajirskom obsluzhivanii naseleniya gorodov (The system of contract relations 
for public transport services to people in the largest cities) Proceedings of the 11th 
Conference on social and economic problems of town transport systems and areas of their 
influence development. Yekaterinburg, Russia: Ural State University of Economics. 
 
World Bank (2012). A national framework for sustainable urban transport systems. 
Proposals for improving urban transportation in Russian cities. Report No 73228-RU. 
Commissioned by the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation. 
 
Zyryanov V. and Sanamov R. (2007). Improving urban public transport operation: 
Experience of Rostov-on-Don. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on 
competition and ownership in land passenger transport, Hamilton Island, Australia. 
